We use a Byzantine failure model, i.e., faulty nodes may behave arbitrarily, subject only to the restrictions mentioned below. We allow for a very strong adversary that can coordinate faulty nodes, delay communication, inject messages into the network, or delay correct nodes in order to cause the most damage to the replicated service. We do assume that the adversary cannot delay correct nodes indefinitely.
We use cryptographic techniques to establish session keys, authenticate messages, and produce digests. We use the SFS  implementation of a Rabin-Williams public-key cryptosystem with a 1024-bit modulus to establish 128-bit session keys. All messages are then authenticated using message authentication codes (MACs)  computed using these keys. Message digests are computed using MD5 .
We assume that the adversary (and the faulty nodes it controls) is computationally bound so that (with very high probability) it is unable to subvert these cryptographic techniques. For example, the adversary cannot forge signatures or MACs without knowing the corresponding keys, or find two messages with the same digest. The cryptographic techniques we use are thought to have these properties.
Previous Byzantine-fault tolerant state-machine replication systems [6,26,16] also rely on the assumptions described above. We require no additional assumptions to match the guarantees provided by these systems, i.e., to provide safety if less than 1/3 of the replicas become faulty during the lifetime of the system. To tolerate more faults we need additional assumptions: we must mutually authenticate a faulty replica that recovers to the other replicas, and we need a reliable mechanism to trigger periodic recoveries. These could be achieved by involving system administrators in the recovery process, but such an approach is impractical given our goal of recovering replicas frequently. Instead, we rely on the following assumptions:
Secure Cryptography. Each replica has a secure cryptographic co-processor, e.g., a Dallas Semiconductors iButton, or the security chip in the motherboard of the IBM PC 300PL. The co-processor stores the replica's private key, and can sign and decrypt messages without exposing this key. It also contains a true random number generator, e.g., based on thermal noise, and a counter that never goes backwards. This enables it to append random numbers or the counter to messages it signs.
Read-Only Memory. Each replica stores the public keys for other replicas in some memory that survives failures without being corrupted (provided the attacker does not have physical access to the machine). This memory could be a portion of the flash BIOS. Most motherboards can be configured such that it is necessary to have physical access to the machine to modify the BIOS.
Watchdog Timer. Each replica has a watchdog timer that periodically interrupts processing and hands control to a recovery monitor, which is stored in the read-only memory. For this mechanism to be effective, an attacker should be unable to change the rate of watchdog interrupts without physical access to the machine. Some motherboards and extension cards offer the watchdog timer functionality but allow the timer to be reset without physical access to the machine. However, this is easy to fix by preventing write access to control registers unless some jumper switch is closed.
These assumptions are likely to hold when the attacker does not have physical access to the replicas, which we expect to be the common case. When they fail we can fall back on system administrators to perform recovery.
Note that all previous proactive security algorithms [24,13,14,3,10] assume the entire program run by a replica is in read-only memory so that it cannot be modified by an attacker. Most also assume that there are authenticated channels between the replicas that continue to work even after a replica recovers from a compromise. These assumptions would be sufficient to implement our algorithm but they are less likely to hold in practice. We only require a small monitor in read-only memory and use the secure co-processors to establish new session keys between the replicas after a recovery.
The only work on proactive security that does not assume authenticated channels is , but the best that a replica can do when its private key is compromised in their system is alert an administrator. Our secure cryptography assumption enables automatic recovery from most failures, and secure co-processors with the properties we require are now readily available, e.g., IBM is selling PCs with a cryptographic co-processor in the motherboard at essentially no added cost.
We also assume clients have a secure co-processor; this simplifies the
key exchange protocol between clients and replicas but it could be avoided
by adding an extra round to this protocol.
Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov, "Proactive Recovery in a Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant System", in Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, San Diego, USA, October 2000.